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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Rohingyas are widely considered to be the most persecuted 
people in the world.1 Though they have lived in what is now 
southwestern Myanmar for hundreds of years,2 the Burmese 
government denied the Rohingyas citizenship at the country’s 
independence from Britain.3 This statelessness, and the bigotry 
underlying it, has led to waves of violence, forced labor, rape, and 
murder.4 In August 2017, the persecution reached a fevered pitch. After 
a Rohingya separatist group—the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 
(“ARSA”)—killed twelve members of Myanmar’s security forces, the 
military retaliated with disproportionate brutality—razing villages, 
raping women, and murdering thousands of innocent people.5 During 
this campaign, more than 725,000 of the 1.2 million Burmese 
Rohingyas fled across the border into Bangladesh.6 At least 6,700 
Rohingyas, including at least 730 children under the age of five, were 
killed in the month after the violence broke out.7 The exact scale of the 
 
1. See Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/
rohingyas-burma/540513 [https://perma.cc/L6EL-285U] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
2. MOSHE YEGAR, THE MUSLIMS OF BURMA 2 (1972); Myanmar Rohingya: What You 
Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
41566561 [https://perma.cc/7NBW-9535] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
3. AZEEM IBRAHIM, THE ROHINGYAS: INSIDE MYANMAR’S HIDDEN GENOCIDE 35-36 
(2016); Adam Simpson, Ian Holliday & Nicholas Farrelly, Myanmar Futures, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 433-34 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). 
4. Ibrahim supra note 3, at 51. 
5. Nahal Toosi, The Genocide the U.S. Didn’t See Coming, POLITICO (Mar./Apr. 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/04/obama-rohingya-genocide-myanmar-
burma-muslim-syu-kii-217214 [https://perma.cc/QF2M-ZP2J] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
6.  Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, ¶ 751 (Sept. 17, 2018); Syed 
S. Mahmood et al., The Rohingya People of Myanmar: Health, Human Rights, and Identity 389 
LANCET 1841, 1844 (2017); see also Rohingya Refugee Crisis, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR THE 
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF., https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/AEK5-QZQD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
7.  MSF: At Least 6,700 Rohingya Killed During Attacks in Myanmar, DOCTORS 
WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-least-
6700-rohingya-killed-during-attacks-myanmar [https://perma.cc/6XSF-TMQ2] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018). Contrarily, the Myanmar government puts the number of dead at 400. Myanmar 
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violence remains unknown because Myanmar has limited access to the 
affected areas.8 
The international community has condemned the Burmese 
military’s brutal campaign against the Rohingyas. U.S. Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson called it an “ethnic cleansing.”9 Similarly, a top 
United Nations official said the action bears “the hallmarks of a 
genocide.”10 But where the international community sees the 
Rohingyas as victims of abject persecution, the Burmese political 
authorities portray them as dangerous foreigners influenced by Islamist 
extremism who are intent on overtaking the homeland.11 These 
competing narratives will make resolution of the conflict exceedingly 
difficult. 
Whatever form reconciliation takes, if it is to be enduring, there 
must be justice and accountability for the violence unleashed by the 
Burmese military on Rohingya civilians. This Essay explores the 
means of justice and accountability available to relevant actors, namely 
the National League for Democracy (“NLD”)-led government, the 
international community, and Myanmar’s neighbors. It proceeds in five 
parts. Part I provides an overview of the political history of Myanmar. 
The first Section of this Part presents a general history of the nation-
state, focusing on its periods of colonization, military junta control, and 
post-2008 transition to democracy. The second Section of this Part 
describes the Rohingya people, their history of persecution, and how 
their current condition became so precarious. 
Drawing on contemporary journalism and non-government 
organization (“NGO”) reports, Part II describes the current conflict, 
including its acute causes and immediate outlook. Part III provides an 
 
Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 [https://perma.cc/7NBW-9535] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
8. Toosi, supra note 5. 
9. Arshad Mohammed & David Brunnstrom, U.S. calls Myanmar moves against Rohingya 
‘ethnic cleansing,’ REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya-usa/u-s-calls-myanmar-moves-against-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-
idUSKBN1DM1N3 [https://perma.cc/Z8A4-DR95] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
10.  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/70, ¶ 65 (Mar. 23, 2018). 
11. Calamur, supra note 1. Notably, many critics of the Myanmar government argue that 
it is strategically and insincerely expressing this view as a pretext for oppression.  See, e.g., 
Violet Cho, Ethnicity and Identity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 
43, 43, 49-50 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). 
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overview of transitional justice options that may be considered in this 
particular case, segmented by the actors who may pursue them. The 
first Section of this Part focuses on the two domestic authorities of 
Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government and the 
military. It analyzes what interest each authority may have in 
transitional justice and surveys the available options that each may be 
disposed to employ. The second Section considers transitional justice 
options that may be undertaken by international actors, such as the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the United Nations (“UN”), and 
third-party states. Finally, the third Section of this Part considers 
whether Myanmar’s neighboring countries may intervene in the crisis. 
Part IV concludes by summarizing this Essay’s findings and 
calling for justice for the Rohingyas. 
A. Political History of Myanmar 
Myanmar is a Southeast Asian nation-state of more than 100 
ethnic groups, bordering India, Bangladesh, China, Laos and 
Thailand.12 Through the nineteenth century, various city-states rose 
and fell within the modern borders. 13 In 1824, Britain began colonizing 
Burma, taking complete control of the country in 1886 and 
administering it as a part of its Indian Empire.14 British colonial rule 
ended in Myanmar on January 4, 1948, and democratically elected 
civilians governed the country for the subsequent fifteen years.15 In 
 
12. Cho, supra note 11. Ethnicity and Identity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 43, 43 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). Though the government 
recognizes 135 indigenous ethnic groups, seven groups comprise the majority of the population 
(i.e. Burman (Bamar) 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 
2%). CIA, Burma: People and Society, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/
UVC9-7RVK] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).   
13. CIA, Burma: Introduction, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/533C-ED23] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2018).  
14. Id. Contemporary ethnic politics in Myanmar are largely a legacy of British colonial 
policies, which involved the classification and enumeration of “racial” groups, in many instances 
leading to ethnic consciousness. Cho, supra note 11, at 43. In pre-colonial times, it appears that 
social categories other than race were of greater importance, such as class distinction and land 
possession. Id. Ever since Britain designated race as the primary category of social organization, 
“[t]he postcolonial state has invested significant resources into popularizing ‘Burmese’ as a 
panethnic category and in countering ethnic minority group-making projects that challenge the 
perceived interests of the state.” Id. 
15. Lee Jones, Political Economy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
MYANMAR 181, 181 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). 
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1962, General Ne Win successfully launched a military coup, which 
replaced the democratic governance model with a military-backed 
Leninist control apparatus.16 In turn, this regime collapsed during 
widespread civil unrest in 1988.17 Within months of Ne Win’s 
downfall, the military—formally known as the Tatmadaw—crushed 
student-led protests, and a nineteen-member military junta took 
power.18 In 1990, the Tatmadaw-backed government administered 
multiparty legislative elections, which Aung San Suu Kyi’s party—the 
NLD—won in a landslide victory.19 The totalitarian government 
rejected this outcome and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest 
from 1989 to 1995, 2000 to 2002, and from May 2003 to November 
2010.20 
In late September 2007, the ruling junta once again brutally 
suppressed protests led by prodemocracy activists and Buddhist 
monks.21 Nonetheless, in late 2008, the junta administered a 
constitutional referendum, the first vote in Burma since 1990.22 While 
the referendum was deemed illegitimate by outside observers, a 
majority of voters approved the constitution,23 which “reserves a 
quarter of legislative seats for serving military personnel, mandates 
direct military appointments to the executive, and allocates the 
Tatmadaw a key role in many aspects of national governance.”24 
In November 2010, the junta administered legislative elections 
where the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party 
captured over seventy-five percent of the contested seats.25 Though the 
newly elected government was largely composed of former or current 
military officers, it initiated reforms in governance and trade that 
significantly opened Myanmar to the international community from a 
long period of isolation.26 The reforms culminated in the 2015 election, 
 
16. Ian Holliday & Su Mon Thazin Aung, The Executive, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 227, 227 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). 
17. CIA, supra note 13. 
18. Holliday & Aung, supra note 16. 
19. CIA, supra note 13. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Burma: Election Fundamentally Flawed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 4, 2015 
12:00 AM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/04/burma-election-fundamentally-flawed 
[https://perma.cc/TKE9-ZXH6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
24.  Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433-35. 
25. CIA, supra note 13. 
26. Id. 
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which was won, to the shock of many international observers, by the 
opposition party: Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD.27 After more than five 
decades of military dictatorship, Burma’s first credibly elected civilian 
government was sworn into office on March 30, 2016.28 
B. The Rohingya People 
The Rohingyas are an ethnic Muslim community who practice 
a Sufi-inflected variation of Sunni Islam.29 Before August 2017, the 
majority of the estimated 1.1 million Rohingya people resided in 
the Rakhine State of Myanmar, on the country’s western coast facing 
the Bay of Bengal, where they accounted for nearly a third of the 
population.30 The Rohingyas are a small minority in Myanmar,31 
differing from the dominant Buddhist groups ethnically, 
linguistically, and religiously.32 
The ancestors of the Rohingyas were Arab and Persian traders 
who arrived in Lower Burma as early as in the ninth century.33 By the 
twelfth century, Rohingya communities were well-established in what 
is now Rakhine State, then called Arakan.34 For centuries, the 
Rohingya communities were governed by the Mrauk U or Mrohaung 
kingdom, which was independent of both the Burmese kingdoms in the 
Irrawaddy delta and central Burma, and the Bengal and Mogul empires 
in India.35 In 1784, the Kingdom of Ava, located in central Burma, 
conquered Arakan and ruled the region with an iron fist, subjecting the 
Rohingyas to forced conscription and massacres.36 Accordingly, when 
British colonial forces prepared to invade Burma in 1824, the 
Rohingyas allied with the British against their oppressor, the Burmese 
king.37 
 
27. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433. 
28. CIA, supra note 13. 
29. Eleanor Albert, The Rohingya Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 9, 
2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis [https://perma.cc/V3MZ-HBFB] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
30. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised? 7 (CANBERRA PAPERS ON 
STRATEGY & DEF. No. 150, 2003).  
31. The total population is estimated to be 55,123,814. CIA, supra note 12. 
32. Albert, supra note 29. 
33. YEGAR, supra note 2, at 2. 
34. Id. 
35. KAZI FAHMIDA FARZANA, MEMORIES OF BURMESE ROHINGYA REFUGEES: 
CONTESTED IDENTITY AND BELONGING 42 (2017). 
36. Id. at 43-44. 
37. Id. at 44. 
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Myanmar became independent from Britain in 1948, and the new 
nation-state’s borders were drawn in accordance with the boundaries 
of pre-colonial Myanmar circa 1824.38 Thus, the newly independent 
Myanmar included the home of the Rohingyas—Arakan, renamed 
Rakhine State—which for most of human history had been 
independent, and sometimes even at war with, the Burmese 
kingdoms.39 
The new nation-state of Myanmar inherited a complex assortment 
of ethnic groups and religious beliefs, and the Burmese elite debated 
whether to create a Buddhist Burmese polity or an inclusive state that 
granted citizenship to all within its borders.40 The debate remained 
unsettled until General Ne Win and the Tatmadaw took power in 
1962.41 Given the absence of a homogeneous ethnic identity for the 
new nation-state, the Tatmadaw co-opted Buddhism, the majority 
religion, designating it as the “essential criterion for being a ‘true 
Burmese.’”42 To this end, during the 1970s and 1980s, the military “co-
opted organised Buddhism as the state religion.”43 
In 1982, the Ne Win-controlled government passed the 
Citizenship Law, which delineated the various ethnicities of Myanmar 
into 135 “national races.”44 The law did not deem the Rohingyas to be 
a “national race”; instead, it designated them as “non-nationals” and 
“foreign residents,” abolishing their rights.45 This loss of legal status 
led to restrictions on movement, fewer educational opportunities, as 
well as insecure land tenure.46 It ultimately culminated in waves of 
violence, forced labor, beatings, and rape.47 This systematic 
persecution has caused intermittent waves of Rohingya migration 
 
38. IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 35. 
39. Id.; MOHAMMED ASHRAF ALAM, A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARAKAN 
26 (1999).  
40.  IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 35-36. While many ethnic groups received automatic 
citizenship via the 1947 Constitution, the Rohingya were a notable exception. Id. at 48. 
41. Id. at 36-37. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 434. 
45. CIA, Burma: Transnational Issues, in The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/533C-ED23]. As of 
2014, Myanmar state policy provides two options to Rohingyas instead of citizenship: they 
“must demonstrate their family has lived in Burma for at least 60 years to qualify for a lesser 
naturalized citizenship and the classification of Bengali or be put in detention camps and face 
deportation.” Id. 
46. IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 51. 
47. Id. at 51-52. 
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within and out of Myanmar. Before the Tatmadaw’s violent campaign 
in August 2017, the United Nations estimated that there were 120,000 
internally displaced Rohingya and as many as 420,000 Rohingya 
refugees in Southeast Asia.48 Since August 2017, an additional 725,000 
Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh.49 
Despite the persecution to which they have been subjected, the 
Rohingyas claim full Burmese citizenship as their natural right.50 In 
contrast, Burmese government officials and a majority of the 
population say that the Rohingyas are “Bengali” foreigners who have 
never been a part of Myanmar’s history.51 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CRISIS 
In August 2016, in response to increasing international pressure 
regarding the mistreatment of the Rohingyas, the newly elected NLD-
led government appointed an international advisory commission, 
chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to put forward 
recommendations to surmount the political, socio-economic, and 
humanitarian challenges that faced Rakhine State.52 By early October 
2016, the situation in Rakhine State was relatively stable, despite the 
ongoing incarceration of over 100,000 Rohingya in internally displaced 
peoples camps.53 On October 9, 2016, however, the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army launched coordinated armed attacks on three border 
posts in northern Rakhine State, killing nine Myanmar police officers.54 
As a result, the Tatmadaw significantly increased its presence in the 
region, which was soon followed by attendant allegations of abuse of 
 
48. Myanmar: Who are the Rohingya?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims-
170831065142812.html [https://perma.cc/K6P3-DREH] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
49.  Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 749-51. 
50. FARZANA, supra note 35, at 2. 
51. Id.; Hannah Beech, Across Myanmar, Denial of Ethnic Cleansing and Loathing of 
Rohingya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/
myanmar-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing.html. 
52. Myanmar names Kofi Annan to head panel on Rohingya Muslims, AP NEWS (Aug. 24, 
2016), https://apnews.com/671961298f7d4f899898d0c063319ffa [https://perma.cc/MWY6-
3NBH]. 
53. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435. 
54. Yee Ywal Myint, Rakhine border raids kill nine police officers, MYANMAR TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/22992-rakhine-border-raids-kill-
nine-police-officers.html [https://perma.cc/TUD5-23HD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
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the Muslim community and an exodus of 70,000 Rohingyas to 
Bangladesh.55 
Nearly one year later, Annan’s advisory commission delivered its 
final report, which included comprehensive recommendations on 
measures to achieve peace in Rakhine State.56 The NLD government 
committed to implement the recommendations “to the fullest extent, 
and within the shortest timeframe possible.”57 One day after the report 
was released, ARSA militants attacked thirty police stations and an 
army barracks in northern Rakhine State,58 eliciting a brutal military 
response which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights labelled 
“a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”59 At least 6,700 Rohingyas, 
including at least 730 children under the age of five, were killed in the 
month after the violence broke out, according to Doctors Without 
Borders.60 Amnesty International reported that some Myanmar soldiers 
raped and abused Rohingya women and girls.61 Human Rights Watch 
reported that at least 288 villages were partially or totally destroyed by 
fire.62 Satellite imagery shows many areas where Rohingya villages 
were reduced to rubble, while nearby ethnic Rakhine villages were left 
intact.63 Notably, most of the damage occurred between August 25 and 
September 25, 2017—with many villages destroyed after September 5, 
 
55. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435. 
56. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON RAKHINE STATE, TOWARDS A PEACEFUL, FAIR AND 
PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RAKHINE (2017). 
57.  Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435. 
58. Id.; Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 749-51. 
59. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Darker and 
More Dangerous: High Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council on Human Rights 
Issues in 40 Countries (Sept. 11, 2017). 
60. MSF: At Least 6,700 Rohingya Killed During Attacks in Myanmar, DOCTORS 
WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-least-
6700-rohingya-killed-during-attacks-myanmar [https://perma.cc/3LT4-JSKW] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018). Contrarily, the Myanmar government puts the number of dead at 400. Myanmar 
Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 [https://perma.cc/7WJG-2SKG] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
61. Myanmar: Crimes against humanity terrorize and drive Rohingya out, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-new-
evidence-of-systematic-campaign-to-terrorize-and-drive-rohingya-out 
[https://perma.cc/V8AU-5JNZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
62. Burma: 40 Rohingya Villages Burned Since October, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 17, 
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/17/burma-40-rohingya-villages-burned-october 
[https://perma.cc/27R7-EMPJ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
63. Id. 
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when Aung San Suu Kyi said security force operations had ended.64 
The Tatmadaw also allegedly opened fire on fleeing civilians and 
planted land mines near border crossings used by Rohingya to flee to 
Bangladesh.65 
Despite the damning NGO reports, the Myanmar authorities have 
claimed total innocence. The Tatmadaw, which currently administers 
northern Rakhine State, has denied committing any abuses.66 At the 
same time, the Tatmadaw has denied access to independent 
investigators and strictly limits access for aid agencies.67 Likewise, 
Aung San Suu Kyi has been reluctant to discuss the matter at all. She 
has condemned “all human rights violations” in Rakhine68 but has 
refused to denounce the indiscriminate use of force by troops or even 
mention the Rohingyas by name.69 
In November 2017, the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh 
reached a deal to repatriate the Rohingya refugees.70 By January, the 
governments finalized a framework, whereby Myanmar agreed to 
accept 1,500 Rohingyas each week, with a goal to increase the return 
flow over time, so that all 781,000 refugees would return to Myanmar 
within two years.71 Rohingya leaders and human rights advocates have 
criticized the agreement as unsafe and premature.72 
III. SURVEY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS FOR 
CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST THE ROHINGYA 
This Part assesses the transitional justice options which may be 
undertaken with regard to the violence perpetrated against the 
Rohingyas from August 2017 until the present. The first Section of this 
Part focuses on the two domestic authorities of Myanmar: Aung San 
 
64. Id. 
65. Albert, supra note 29. 
66. Wa Lone, Myanmar military denies atrocities against Rohingya, replaces General, 
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-
general/myanmar-military-denies-atrocities-against-rohingya-replaces-general-
idUSKBN1DD18S [https://perma.cc/GZ2J-6YKN]. 
67. BBC, supra note 60. 
68. Saif Khalid, Suu Kyi ‘burying head in sand’ over Rohingya crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/suu-kyi-burying-head-sand-rohingya-
crisis-170919092338988.html [https://perma.cc/J8B7-7NDG] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
69. AL JAZEERA, supra note 48. 
70. BBC, supra note 60. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government and the military. It analyzes what 
interest each authority may have in transitional justice and surveys the 
available options that could be employed. The second Section 
considers transitional justice options that may be undertaken by 
international actors, such as the ICC, the United Nations, and third-
party states. Finally, the third Section of this Part considers whether 
Myanmar’s neighboring countries may intervene in the crisis. 
A. Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by the 
NLD-Led Government of Myanmar 
The two key political authorities of Myanmar—the Tatmadaw and 
the NLD—do not seem keen on implementing transitional justice for 
the “ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingyas.73 The Tatmadaw—the alleged 
perpetrators of the crimes—are the strongest opponents of such an 
approach.74 In their view, presumably, the suppression of the 
Rohingyas, especially ARSA, has been just, because they are 
foreigners and terrorists.75 Whether they whole-heartedly believe this 
or are simply attempting to justify their atrocities remains unclear. 
The second power center of the government—Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s NLD party—also appears to be averse to transitional justice.76 
Not only does Suu Kyi refuse to identify the Rohingyas by name, 
shortly after the latest round of violence came to light, her primary 
comment was to say that a “huge iceberg of misinformation” about the 
 
73. Hannah Beech, Year After Rohingya Massacres, Top Generals Unrepentant and 
Unpunished, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/world/
asia/rohingya-myanmar-ethnic-cleansing-anniversary.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2018); Azeem 
Ibrahim. Opinion, Democracy’s False Dawn in Myanmar, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/08/07/democracys-false-
dawn-in-myanmar/?utm_term=.316090f21ee8 [https://perma.cc/WKG6-SGZL] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
74. See Beech, supra note 73; see also Richard C. Paddock, For Myanmar’s Army, Ethnic 
Bloodletting Is Key to Power and Riches, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/world/asia/myanmar-military-ethnic-cleansing.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
75. See Ben Westcott, Myanmar's military clears itself over reported Rohingya atrocities, 
CNN (Nov. 14, 2017, 3:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/13/asia/myanmar-military-
rohingya/index.html [https://perma.cc/UH9U-HQ3G] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).  
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Rohingya crisis was being distributed to benefit “terrorists.”77 The 
rationale underlying the NLD’s silence and implicit support of the 
“ethnic cleansing” can only be hypothesized, but four potential reasons 
stand out. First, they may fear the Tatmadaw. After all, the military has 
successfully toppled numerous civilian-led governments and has even 
imprisoned the NLD leadership, including Suu Kyi.78 Second, the NLD 
may actually believe the anti-Rohingya rhetoric. Tensions between the 
ethnic Burmese Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims have existed for 
hundreds of years,79 were further fomented by the British throughout 
the colonial era,80 and have been formalized and given the force of law 
by the Tatmadaw.81 Thus, it is entirely possible that the NLD expressly 
supports the military’s actions. Third, the NLD may oppose the 
mistreatment of the Rohingyas,82 but they may be reluctant to change 
government policy for fear of electoral backlash. The majority of the 
populace, after all, harbors anti-Rohingya sentiments.83 Finally, even if 
the civilian government wanted to hold the military accountable for its 
crimes, it has no power to do so given the structure of the constitution. 
Accordingly, the most likely scenario would be for the 
government of Myanmar to do nothing at all to address the crimes 
against the Rohingyas. Sometimes called de facto amnesty, not doing 
anything is arguably in the best interest of both of the two key political 
authorities of Myanmar. For the military, not acting is the obvious 
choice because they are the ones who would likely be held primarily 
accountable for the crimes.84 For the NLD, not acting offers three 
benefits: (1) ensuring that its leadership would not be held liable for an 
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implicit endorsement of the crimes; (2) warding off a coup from an 
angry military; and (3) avoiding political backlash from an anti-
Rohingya electorate. 
Unlike the Tatmadaw, however, the NLD does have three strong, 
countervailing pressures that militate toward affirmatively pursuing 
transitional justice. First, there has been significant, continuous 
international condemnation of the crimes against the Rohingyas.85 This 
is harmful to the country’s international reputation, which could have 
wide-ranging ramifications for its international affairs, including trade, 
investment, and development assistance. Second, if the NLD could 
successfully put the blame on the Tatmadaw for the killings, it could 
reap a greater share of the power in governance. Third, taking action to 
address the killings is simply the right thing to do. The NLD itself was 
persecuted for decades by the Tatmadaw. Perhaps fresh memories of 
their own mistreatment could push the civilian-led government to 
pursue some kind of transitional justice. What follows is a discussion 
of the various actions that the NLD-led government might take, in order 
from most to least likely. 
1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The most likely transitional justice option that the NLD-led 
government could employ would be a truth and reconciliation 
commission (“TRC”). While these commissions take many forms, at 
their base, truth commissions are “victim-centered, non-judicial 
inquiries, established by governments in the aftermath of conflict and 
war, to ascertain the facts and evidence of human rights violations.”86 
TRCs are an alternative to formal criminal trials as they allow for 
amnesty for perpetrators and victim reparations.87 
A TRC would be attractive to the NLD-led government for several 
reasons. First, it is potentially politically feasible. A TRC, if it was 
constituted without the power to punish, is perhaps the only 
accountability measure that the Tatmadaw—who exercise significant 
control over the government—may be willing to tolerate. Second, a 
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16). 
87. Id. 
114 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
TRC is inherently flexible, much more so than formal prosecution. In 
determining its mission, the NLD-led government could set a 
commission’s focus on any number of subjects for any length of time. 
At its most limited, the TRC might investigate the violence that 
transpired from August 2017 to the present in Rakhine State. 
Alternatively, the TRC could perform a much broader assessment: Are 
the Rohingyas entitled to citizenship? How long have their forebears 
been living within the modern-day borders of Myanmar? What are all 
the injustices that have been perpetrated against them since 
independence? Who bears responsibility for these injustices? 
From a retributive perspective, there would be drawbacks to the 
TRC approach. It would almost certainly ensure that those who were 
primarily responsible for the “ethnic cleansing” would escape punitive 
measures. It is true that a TRC could condition amnesty on truthful and 
forthright testimony, as was done for South Africa’s famous truth 
commission.88 But assuming perpetrators fully cooperated, the only 
“punishment” they would be subjected to would be public 
embarrassment, which is a far cry from jail time. Furthermore, the NLD 
might simply use this mechanism as a ploy to placate international 
criticism—giving the TRC a very narrow focus, limited budget, and 
implicit instructions not to hold powerful people accountable. Indeed, 
this very critique was leveled at the Myanmar government-endorsed 
international advisory commission led by Kofi Annan.89 
2. Exile 
The NLD-led government could also take action to address the 
atrocities against the Rohingyas by exiling the perpetrators. Exile—a 
period of absence from one’s home90—can be voluntary or 
involuntary.91 Either way, it can facilitate a transition to peace.92 
If it becomes clear that a discrete individual or group was 
responsible for the latest atrocity against the Rohingyas, then exile 
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could be a particularly good option for this context. It could appeal to 
the military, including the perpetrators, because it would allow them to 
continue to deny wrongdoing and to avoid jail time or reparations. It 
similarly could be palatable for the NLD and the Rohingyas, because it 
could be a significant step toward a safer Rakhine State. Nonetheless, 
exile does not seem likely in the short term, given the military’s strong 
position in Myanmar and the support of the public. 
3. Lustration  
A third option of the NLD-led government taking action to 
address the atrocities against the Rohingyas would be to lustrate the 
perpetrators. Lustration has been defined as the non-criminal sanction 
of “purging from the public sector those who served the repressive 
regime.”93 This transitional justice approach has typically been 
undertaken in settings where a repressive government has collapsed 
and been replaced by an entirely new, reform-minded government, 
such as post-World War II France and Germany.94 
Modern-day Myanmar does not comport well with the traditional 
circumstances in which lustration has been deployed.95 The Tatmadaw 
is not a former, collapsed power, but rather a current, constitutionally-
mandated part of the government.96 As such, it is unlikely that it would 
abide by any type of lustration program, whether focused on high-level 
perpetrators or low-level soldiers. Furthermore, lustration in this 
context would pose practical challenges. If it were undertaken without 
differentiating levels of culpability, as is often the case and for which 
the practice is criticized,97 then entire divisions of the army might be 
lustrated, which would open the country to significant public safety and 
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security problems. Ultimately, lustration is a poor fit in this 
circumstance from both justice and practicality standpoints. 
4. Domestic Prosecution 
If the NLD-led government elects to take action to address the 
latest round of violence against the Rohingyas, a fourth option would 
be to pursue domestic prosecutions. Proponents of this transitional 
justice approach argue that it “promotes stability, the rule of law, and 
accountability, as well as contributes to deterring future atrocities.”98 
The downsides are that it is slow, expensive, and politically risky.99 
Here, if the NLD sought to pursue good-faith prosecutions of high-level 
perpetrators, the latter consideration—political risk—would guarantee 
the party’s downfall. The Tatmadaw would simply not tolerate 
vigorous prosecution of its own leadership. 
While domestic prosecution could conceivably take place for the 
violence in Rakhine State, it would presumably take one of two forms. 
First, the Myanmar government might seek a one-sided accounting of 
the conflict, prosecuting100 only members of ARSA.101 This is 
improbable because Myanmar has labelled this group “terrorists,”102 so 
lethal force is more likely than prosecution. Second, the Myanmar 
government could establish a sham military tribunal to try Tatmadaw 
perpetrators of violence against the Rohingyas.103 This approach would 
be, by definition, woefully inadequate to achieve real justice.104 Aside 
from these two possibilities, domestic prosecution is nearly 
unimaginable as it would directly contradict the Tatmadaw’s narrative 
of the conflict.105 
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5. Hybrid Tribunal 
The NLD-led government could seek to establish a hybrid, mixed, 
or internationalized criminal tribunal. Such tribunals are highly 
variable, but each tends to “apply a mix of national and international 
law (both procedural and substantive) and feature a blend of 
international and national elements, such as international and national 
judges and personnel.”106 This option is improbable, as the NLD-led 
government has been uncooperative with UN entities since the start of 
the latest violence.107 Indeed, the government has refused to grant visas 
to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar.108 
However, given that the perpetrators are not the NLD-led 
government, but the Tatmadaw, it is conceivable that Aung San Suu 
Kyi could write a letter to the United Nations requesting a tribunal in 
this matter. This is a faint possibility though, because the NLD could 
face violence and political backlash for such a move. Additionally, the 
international community might be skeptical of commencing this 
expensive, arduous process unless there was strong buy-in 
domestically,109 which is not the case here. 
6. Indefinite detention 
A sixth option of the NLD-led government taking action to 
address the atrocities against the Rohingyas would be to indefinitely 
detain perpetrators. This transitional justice option involves 
“incarceration of an unspecified period of time without trial or even a 
formal charge.”110 This approach would be uniquely ill-suited for this 
situation, displeasing both the Tatmadaw and the Rohingyas. As a 
practical matter, civilians in the government would be unable to detain 
the generals, at least not without significant bloodshed or even civil 
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war. Indefinite detention would also not serve the aims of placating the 
Rohingyas or the international community, because it is usually done 
discreetly, with as little publicity as possible. Accordingly, indefinite 
detention of Tatmadaw perpetrators111 is extremely unlikely. 
7. Lethal force 
A seventh and final option that the NLD-led government could 
consider would be using lethal force against perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity. In the transitional justice context, lethal force is the 
“act of state-sponsored, pre-meditated, deliberate, extrajudicial, 
targeted killing.”112 This option, like that of indefinite detention, would 
not be seriously considered by the NLD-led government. Presumably, 
these political leaders do not have the capacity to orchestrate an 
assassination of their own generals.113 
B. Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by the 
International Community 
Even if Myanmar is reluctant to pursue transitional justice for 
crimes against the Rohingyas, the international community may pursue 
it for them. What follows are transitional justice options that may be 
undertaken by the international community, from most to least likely. 
1.  International Criminal Court 
It is becoming increasingly likely that the perpetrators of crimes 
committed against the Rohingyas will be prosecuted by the 
International Criminal Court. There is sufficient evidence for the 
Prosecutor to indict members of the Tatmadaw for violating Article 
7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, which prohibits “[d]eportation or forcible 
transfer of the population” as a crime against humanity.114 There is also 
evidence that the Tatmadaw forces have committed genocide in 
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violation in Article 6, by “killing members of the” Rohingya 
community “with intent to destroy [them], in whole or in part.”115 
As is often the case with the ICC, there is a jurisdictional obstacle. 
The Rome Statute provides jurisdiction in three circumstances: crimes 
committed in the territory of a state party,116 crimes committed by a 
national of a state party,117 and crimes in a jurisdiction that has been 
specifically authorized by the UN Security Council.118 
The ICC cannot assert personal jurisdiction over members of the 
Tatmadaw because Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute. It is 
also extremely unlikely that the UN Security Council will refer this 
situation to the ICC, because China, supported by Russia, would veto 
any referral.119 China has long been a staunch ally of Myanmar, 
providing weapons and training to the Tatmadaw for decades.120 In 
response to the Rohingya crisis, China urged that the international 
community “should support the efforts of Myanmar in safeguarding the 
stability of its national development.”121 
This leaves territorial jurisdiction. Under a traditional, 
conservative reading of the Rome Statute, the ICC could not assert 
territorial jurisdiction over the crimes against the Rohingyas because 
these crimes occurred within the territory of Myanmar, which is not a 
party to the ICC.122 Geoff Curfman, however, contends that the ICC 
could assert territorial jurisdiction over the crime of deportation 
because it necessarily takes place in at least two states, and here, one 
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of those states is a state party to the Rome Statute—Bangladesh.123 As 
the argument goes, since one of the elements of the crime occurred 
within the territory of a state party, the ICC can assert jurisdiction for 
the entire crime.124 While no ICC case has squarely addressed the issue, 
Curfman argues that asserting this form of territorial jurisdiction would 
be consistent with the meaning of the Rome Statute and would advance 
the Court’s purpose of preventing impunity for grave international 
crimes.125 
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, seems to agree. On 
April 9, 2018, the Prosecutor requested a ruling from the ICC’s Pre-
Trial Chamber on whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the 
alleged deportation Rohingyas from Myanmar into Bangladesh.126 In 
response, the Court invited the Myanmar government to submit 
arguments on whether it deemed jurisdiction to be appropriate.127 
Though Myanmar declined to formally respond to the Court,128 the 
country issued a five-page statement lambasting the ICC for even 
considering the question.129 Myanmar stated that “the Court has no 
jurisdiction on Myanmar whatsoever” and argued that the Prosecutor 
was pursuing this case in “[b]ad [f]aith” with a “[l]ack of 
[t]ransparency.”130  
On September 6, 2018, the Court endorsed Curfman’s argument 
and held that “the Court has jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of 
members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, 
provided that such allegations are established to the required 
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threshold.”131 The 2-1 decision did not stop there.132  If the Prosecutor 
could meet the required threshold and establish jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 12(2)(a), the Court observed, she may be able to prosecute 
related crimes such as persecution and inhumane acts.133  
The decision recognizing jurisdiction and greenlighting the 
investigation was lauded by human rights advocates and legal scholars 
as a significant step toward justice.134 Whether an ICC prosecution will 
go forward is an open question, but it may be the Rohingyas’ best 
chance for justice. 
2. UNGA-Created Tribunal 
Given the impasse in the UN Security Council due to the 
guaranteed vetoes of Russia and China, it may be possible for the UN 
General Assembly (“UNGA”) to establish an international criminal 
tribunal for Myanmar. Since there could be no veto, UNGA would be 
able to establish a tribunal as long as there was popular support in the 
chamber.135 There are questions, however, about the legality of such a 
mechanism. 
According to Derek Jinks, proponents of an UNGA-established 
tribunal would have to rely on Article 22 of the Charter,136 which reads, 
“The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”137 Jinks argues 
that such a broad reading of Article 22 is suspect in view of the limited 
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powers otherwise accorded UNGA in the Charter.138 This reading has 
been confirmed by an early advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice and embraced by other international law scholars.139 
Accordingly, even if there was popular support for this mechanism, its 
establishment might constitute an ultra vires exercise of power. 
3. Unilateral Prosecution in Third-Party State via Universal 
Jurisdiction 
The final transitional justice option that may be undertaken by the 
international community would be unilateral prosecution via a third-
party state asserting universal jurisdiction. Though far-fetched, this 
scenario is not wholly without precedent: For example, the former 
Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, was arrested in London under 
universal jurisdiction.140 
In March 2018, lawyers in Melbourne, Australia filed a private 
prosecution application against Aung San Suu Kyi, who was in 
Australia at the time, on charges of crimes against humanity.141 While 
a universal jurisdiction prosecution is possible in Australia, it requires 
the consent of the attorney general.142 This approval was not given, 
presumably on the grounds of diplomatic immunity or because the 
government considered it bad form to invite a foreign dignitary to 
Australia and then proceed to arrest her.143 In sum, it is unlikely that 
perpetrators will be unilaterally prosecuted by a third-party state 
asserting universal jurisdiction. 
C. Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by 
Myanmar’s Neighboring States 
A final possibility to address the Rohingya crisis is the 
intervention of Myanmar’s neighboring states. Contemporary scholars 
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point to eight instances of humanitarian intervention outside the UN 
Charter regime,144 all of which feature two criteria: “(1) The 
intervening state asserted humanitarian purposes (often in conjunction 
with other justifications such as self-defense, regional security, or the 
consent of an opposition group within the state), and (2) the Security 
Council either refused to authorize the intervention under Chapter VII 
or was simply not consulted.”145 
The first, and arguably most prominent, example of humanitarian 
intervention occurred within the same region of Asia as the present-day 
Rohingya conflict. In 1971, as East Pakistan attempted to secede from 
the government of Pakistan, the Pakistani military violently suppressed 
the insurrection, allegedly massacring hundreds of thousands of the 
Bengali population of East Pakistan.146 An estimated 10 million 
refugees poured over the Indian border.147 Citing, inter alia, self-
defense and humanitarian intervention, India invaded East Pakistan; 
West Pakistani forces surrendered thirteen days later, leading to 
independence for Bangladesh.148 
In the present conflict, non-UN-sanctioned intervention by a 
third-party state, for humanitarian purposes or otherwise, is becoming 
increasingly unlikely. Most of Myanmar’s immediate neighbors and 
fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) members 
have either been silent regarding the Rohingya crisis or outright 
supportive of the Myanmar government. Two months after the height 
of the “ethnic cleansing,” a statement issued in conjunction with an 
ASEAN summit was silent as to the exodus of Rohingya Muslims from 
Myanmar’s Rakhine State.149 China, with its long ties to the Tatmadaw 
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and substantial economic interests in the country, has been a steadfast 
supporter of Myanmar,150 and Thailand has even recently awarded 
Myanmar’s army chief a royal decoration.151 
The most likely candidate to intervene in the Rohingya conflict is 
Bangladesh—the very state that itself benefited from humanitarian 
intervention in 1971. Before the most recent crisis began, Bangladesh 
was already hosting a verified population of well over 200,000 
Rohingya from Myanmar.152 As of January 27, 2018, 688,000 new 
arrivals had been registered since the latest violence.153 The 
extraordinary number of refugees is taxing the resources and patience 
of Bangladesh—a geographically small, vastly overcrowded, and 
under-resourced nation—and leading to desperate conditions in its 
refugee camps.154 
In September 2017, the Bangladeshi foreign minister made his 
country’s position on the Rohingya crisis clear: “The international 
community is saying it is a genocide. We also say it is a genocide.”155 
Similarly, the chair of Bangladesh’s National Commission for Human 
Rights said that the Commission might press for an international 
tribunal to hold leading figures in Myanmar accountable for 
“genocide.”156 However, the Bangladeshi foreign minister added that 
Dhaka was seeking a peaceful solution, not a “war” against 
Myanmar.157 
Since the Bangladeshi government’s more heated rhetoric in 
September, the bilateral relationship seems to have improved. In 
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November 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to a deal for the 
repatriation of Rohingya refugees to their homeland.158 Following 
this initial arrangement, in December, the two countries formed a 
Joint Working Group to start the process by January 2018159—a 
process Bangladesh initially demanded be completed within two 
years.160 Notably, the Rohingyas and international human rights 
organizations were not consulted during the negotiations,161 and many 
refugees are reluctant to consent to forced, ill-conceived repatriation.162 
In sum, the current negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
would seem to foreclose the possibility of humanitarian intervention by 
a neighboring state at this time. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the strong condemnation from the international 
community immediately after the genocide, the possibility that the 
Tatmadaw will be made to account for their crimes is remote. By 
making their seat at the table of government in Myanmar 
constitutionally mandated in 2008, the Tatmadaw has ensured that they 
may act with impunity. Even if the NLD-led government wanted to 
seek justice for the Rohingyas—which is doubtable—it could not do so 
without triggering the all-too-real possibility of a coup. And the most 
vigorous transitional justice mechanism conceivable in the domestic 
context is a toothless TRC. Accordingly, the Rohingyas’ salvation must 
come from outside the country. 
Unfortunately, transitional justice imposed from the outside 
seems almost as unlikely as justice coming from within. The UN 
Security Council is paralyzed, once again, by the intransigence of 
certain Power Five members. The next best option—the ICC 
Prosecutor indicting leaders of the Tatmadaw propio motu—is tenuous 
due to jurisdictional problems. The final chance for justice for the 
Rohingyas—intervention by Bangladesh—is also extremely unlikely. 
Instead of moving to safeguard the refugees, Bangladesh seeks to get 
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rid of them as soon as possible. Ultimately, at least for the foreseeable 
future, it would seem that the Rohingyas will have to face one more 
injustice—impunity for their oppressors. 
I close by echoing the words of Nobel Peace Prize laureate, 
Muhammad Yunus: 
“I humbly add my voice to the simple demand of the Rohingya 
people: that their rights as our fellow human beings be respected, 
that they be granted the right to live peacefully and without fear in 
the land of their parents, and without persecution on grounds of 
their ethnicity or their form of worship.”163 
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